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Abstract
This paper gathers together deliberations surrounding Steve Biko’s I Write What I Like
as it simultaneously registers the critical importance of the text as an incomplete history.
Rather than presupposing the text as a form of biography or following a trend of
translating Biko into a prophet of reconciliation, I argue that the text leads us towards the
postcolonial problematic of self-writing. That problematic, I argue, names the encounter
between self-writing and an apparatus of reading. The paper stages the encounter as a way
to make explicit the text’s postcolonial interests and to mark the onset of an incomplete
history. This, I argue incidentally, is where the postcolonial critic may set to work to
finish the critique of apartheid. Incomplete histories call attention to how that which is
unintelligible in a text makes an authoritative reading difficult.
How else can one write but of those things which one doesn’t know, or
knows badly? It is precisely there that we imagine having something to
say. We write only at the frontiers of our knowledge, at the border that
separates our knowledge from our ignorance and transforms the one
into the other. Only in this manner are we resolved to write…Perhaps
writing has a relation to silence altogether more threatening than that
which it is supposed to entertain with death. (Deleuze 1994:xxi)
Steve [Biko] had a sure centre. (Woods 1978:95)
Ever since the brutal murder of Steve Biko at the hands of South African
security police in 1977, there has been a concerted effort not to surrender
his story to those responsible for his death by letting them have the last
word.1 In a bid to guard against such an eventuality, Biko’s spirit is
increasingly being enshrined in the collection of his political writings
published under the title I Write What I Like shortly after his untimely death
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while in police custody in Port Elizabeth. The text is taken as a biography
in the making that was cut short by a cruel act of violence.2 Writing in 1978,
Aelred Stubbs for example noted the following in the preface to the
publication of Biko’s writings in terms that remind us how the text might
supplement a biography:
The time for a comprehensive biography of Steve Biko is not yet. But
it is hoped that the production of a book containing a selection of his
writings may be timely, that it may serve to inform those who all over
the world know the name of Biko only in the dreadful context of his
death, a little more fully what manner of man he was. For this reason
nothing is said in depth about his death, crucial as this is in a final
assessment of the man. (Biko 1979:v)
What concerns me is the way in which Biko’s writing is construed as an
element of biography but not, as its title might otherwise suggest, as a
statement about political constraint. In this paper, I seek to gather together
a history of deliberation about Biko’s writing in what I will call an apparatus
of reading. By apparatus of reading I mean the disciplinary and political
frameworks that authorise and enable the tasks of reading – the machine not
too dissimilar to the state that makes us speak and act in a certain way. In
staging an encounter between Biko’s writing and an apparatus of reading,
I seek to identify the point at which a biographical reading falters and is
rendered unsustainable. At that point, I wish to suggest, Biko’s writing
lends itself to a postcolonial argument that makes I Write What I Like
available to the South African present. My argument, briefly, is that I Write
What I Like is not so much a biography under construction as it is a text that
names the postcolonial problematic of self-writing.
The article consists of four sections. I begin by reflecting on the question
of self-writing by considering briefly a recent essay by Achille Mbembe and
the furore surrounding J M Coetzee’s Disgrace so as to specify what I mean
by the postcolonial problematic of self-writing. Thereafter, I examine
political discourses that encounter the writing of Steve Biko, particularly
those positions that set out to fulfil its biographical promise. In the final
sections, I address the question of incomplete histories as a specific strategy
for thinking about where to begin the narrative of postcolonial difference in
the wake of apartheid.
Postcolonial Self-Writing
In an essay on African modes of self-writing, Achille Mbembe argues that
the conditions under which the African subject could attain full selfhood
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had been thwarted not only by imperialism but also by the combined effects
of Afro-radicalism and nativism (2002:240). Central to Afro-radicalism
and nativism was a politics of recovery – of self, property and past. I am
sympathetic to the politics that drives Mbembe’s critique of Afro-radicalism
and nativism, and have also elsewhere tried to highlight its consequences
for the discipline of history (although not nearly as eloquently). But what
concerns me is the effort to move the story of the subject along, to the point
of exploring self-styling, as Mbembe puts it. What in particular I want to
recall in this discussion of self-writing is none other than the weight of
history – not the long history of subjugation that Mbembe confronts but
rather the poetics of history. By this I mean that Mbembe, in his determination
to finalise the history of the incomplete subject by substituting it with a self-
styling subject,  fails – I will argue – to acknowledge that self-writing is an
effect staged in an encounter with an apparatus of reading. It is perhaps in
this convergence that postcolonial criticism potentially approaches
something like the productivity of incomplete histories.
The point about the limits of an African mode of self-writing is presciently
conveyed in the controversy which raged recently in the South African press
concerning J M Coetzee’s Disgrace, which was earlier named at a South
African Human Rights Commission hearing as an example of racist writing.
The Commission, as a specific apparatus of reading, understood the text as
autobiography and thereby pronounced on a reality effect in a work of
literature. Yet, as with much of Coetzee’s earlier writing, the position of the
writer is less obvious than is presumed. The apparatus of reading perhaps
too hastily perceived the verb to write as an active verb and produced,
consequently, the charge of racism. But the charge of racism carries an
assumption that the writing is aimed at, as Barthes puts it in a text that
Coetzee elsewhere cites, an exterior or antecedent person. It must therefore
deny the possibility of self-writing, of self as effect and affect of writing.
Consider the following quotation attributed to Coetzee in which he echoes
Barthes’ essay “To Write: An Intransitive Verb”:
Though modern Indo-European languages retain morphologically
distinct forms for only the active-passive opposition, the phantom
presence of a middle voice (a voice still present in Ancient Greek and
Sanskrit) can be felt in some senses of the modern verbs if one is alert
to the possibility of the threefold opposition active-middle-passive.
“To write” is one of these verbs. To write (active) is to carry out the
action without reference to the self, perhaps, though not necessarily,
on behalf of someone else. To write (middle) is to carry out the action
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(or better, to do writing) with reference to the self. Or – to follow
Barthes in his metaphorical leap from grammar to meaning – “today to
write is to make oneself the centre of the action of la parole; it is to
effect writing in being affected oneself, it is to leave the writer inside
the writing, not as a psychological subject…but as the agent of action”.
The field of writing, Barthes goes on to suggest, has today become
nothing but writing itself, not as art for art’s sake but as the only space
there is for the one who writes. (Coetzee in Dovey 1988:14-15).
The leap from grammar to meaning is of course a leap over the law of the
difference between “what can be said and what is actually said”.3 In this
respect it is interesting that Coetzee omits the following comment in
Barthes’ formulation that appears in parenthesis marking the difference
between a psychological subject and the scriptor as agent of the action: “the
Indo-European priest could perfectly well be overflowing with subjectivity
while actively sacrificing for his client”. The reference is to an earlier
comment by Barthes when he draws a parallel with the example given by
Meillet and Benveniste to illustrate and enable his leap. Barthes writes:
According to the classic example given by Meillet and Benveniste, the
verb to sacrifice (ritually) is active if the priest sacrifices the victim in
my place and for me, and it is the middle voice if, taking the knife from
the priest’s hands, I make a sacrifice for my own sake; in the case of the
active voice, the action is performed outside the subject, for although
the priest makes the sacrifice, he is not affected by it; in the case of the
middle voice, on the contrary, by acting, the subject affects himself, he
always remains inside the action, even if that action involves an object.
(1986:18)
The distance between priest and client, between scriptor and writing, is
asymptotically diminished here in keeping with the desire expressed by
Barthes. But in no way can it account for the difference with the apparatus
of reading that circumscribes the realms of what can be said. In skipping
over the reference to the discussion of the Indo-European priest, Coetzee
symptomatically sacrifices the apparatus of reading. The implication is that
self-writing takes place in spite of, rather than as a result of, the presence
of “the priest”.
By contrast, in staging the confrontation between self-writing and the
apparatus of reading I am not merely calling attention to the demand to read
what is necessarily unintelligible in the frameworks of such an apparatus,
important though that may be. I am also asking how that which is specifically
unintelligible renders an authoritative reading difficult. In other words,
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unlike biography, self-writing, as a postcolonial strategy, is an eruption that
defines the limits of an apparatus of reading.4
Biography under Construction
The political legacy of Steve Biko as one of the founders of the Black
Consciousness Movement (BCM) in South Africa is often critiqued for its
overt emphasis on subjectivation so that the struggle for the constitution of
the self is seen as ultimately inadequate to the tasks of fighting apartheid.
As Oliver Tambo, the exiled leader of the African National Congress
(ANC), was to suggest in a comment about the 1976 Soweto uprising:
[T]he fact that the popular rebellion did not become an insurrection
pointed up limitations in Black Consciousness ideology. There had
been a lack of political direction to guide the outbreak of collective
anger in the townships and, although there was some solidarity between
the youth and workers, the gulf had not been bridged. Among the youth
there arose an awareness that revolution required organisation and
comprehensive policies capable of guiding struggle through different
phases. Whatever the strengths of the upsurge of 1976 they lacked a
strategy and tactics which could only be found in the leadership of the
ANC. (Tambo 1987:114)
In his report to the National Executive Committee in 1985, the sense of
limitation of what was referred to as Black Consciousness ideology had
given way to a claim that Biko had arrived at the conclusion that the ANC
was the leader of the revolution. More importantly it was claimed that Biko
had accepted that the Black People’s Convention should operate within the
broad strategy of the ANC and concentrate its efforts on mass mobilisation
(Tambo 1987:126).5 What Tambo seemed to be emphasising was a more
general tendency to see Biko and his thought as a variation on the theme of
African nationalism, but a specific manifestation of what Gail Gerhart calls
the “Fanonesque apocalypse” that accompanied the rise of Black
Consciousness in the 1970s (Gerhart 1978:14).6  The strains of this form of
racially exclusive politics, which is how she sees it, can be traced through
the ideological formation of African nationalism in South Africa. Gerhart
reduces Black Consciousness to an identity claim in the ideological
circumstances of a racial convergence between Afrikaner Nationalist
conservativism and a racially particular liberalism. In some respects,
narrating Biko has always tended towards filling in the missing exteriority
of his politics or what in history one might call filling in the gaps, and in
semiology and deconstruction the search for the transcendental signifier.
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This tendency can be traced in both nationalist and liberal discourses that
encounter the thought of Black Consciousness and which are produced at
the expense of the intransitive verb “to write” that suggests itself in Biko’s
collection of political writings published under the title I Write What I Like.
The tendency can also be tracked, for example, in the programmatic
response of the exiled ANC to the idea of Black Consciousness popularised
by Biko and other members of the BCM. A few months before Steve Biko
was killed in detention in 1977, the ANC introduced the concept of internal
colonialism into its analysis of the South African political crisis. The timing
was not entirely coincidental since the programmatic statement on internal
colonialism, a concept that resonates with Biko’s unfolding of the logic of
Black Consciousness, seemed to absorb the full weight of the political
resurgence marked by the advent of mass resistance to apartheid in the late
1970s. At the Lisbon Conference in March 1977, the ANC’s analysis of the
South African situation was described as one of internal colonialism:
The South African National Liberation Movement, the ANC and its
allies, characterise the South African social formation as a system of
‘internal colonialism’ or ‘colonialism of a special type’. What is
special or different about the colonial system as it obtains in South
Africa is that there is no spatial separation between the colonising
power (the white minority state) and the colonised black people. But
in every respect, the features of classic colonialism are the hallmark of
the relations that obtain between the black majority and a white
minority. The special features of South Africa’s internal colonialism
are also compounded by the fact that the white South African state,
parliament and government are juridically independent of any
metropolitan country and have a sovereignty legally vested in them by
various Acts of the British government and state. These juridical
formalities should not be allowed to cloud the colonial content of the
white supremacist state. (Statement of Lisbon Conference 1977:1)
Internal colonialism was a concept specifically aimed at capturing the
attention of a generation of youth who had been captivated by the ideals of
Black Consciousness, even as it sought to present the latter concept as
inadequate to the tasks facing the political movement in South Africa. The
ANC seemed to invoke the idea to mark the way in which a colonial legacy
persisted as a residual, although effective, strategy of a system of racialised
territorial governmentality. In elaborating the concept and by establishing
“what was different about the colonial system as it obtains in South Africa”,
the ANC seemed to be calling attention to what it saw as a shortcoming in
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Biko’s contemporaneous reflections on the struggle in South Africa. Without
referring to it specifically, the 1977 programme effectively reduced the
concept of Black Consciousness to a rather uncomplicated pursuit of the
Kantian ideal of a release from self-incurred tutelage.7 In opposition to
Biko’s supposedly limited emphasis on the interiorisation of the colonial
predicament, the ANC seemed to stress the sovereign state as a specific
exteriority that might alter the tactical horizons of political action.
The reconfiguration of the tactical dimensions of Biko’s political position
resulted in a rather limited range of possible interpretations of Black
Consciousness, the concept advanced by Biko and his cohort. It tended to
reduce its politics to a game of self-interpretation, or to paraphrase Samuel
Weber, to a soliloquy of the soul. It also then inadvertently stabilised the
concept of blackness by designating the sovereign law as transcendental
signifier. With this apparent narrowing of the interpretive field, by way of
the expansion of the empirical field, the work on the self, through a politics
of writing – a subjectivity in writing – that is suggested in the title of Biko’s
I Write What I Like, was altogether obliterated. More particularly, the
ambiguity between self-consciousness and unconscious desire that is
conveyed by the iteration of the “I” in the title was not made available to
political discourse.
Several histories of the Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa
re-enact this supposed demarcation of the interiority of the self and the
exteriority of the state. Foremost among these is Gail Gerhart’s study of
Black Consciousness, in which she argues that “like the ideologues of
orthodox African nationalism from Lembede onward, Biko and the architects
of SASO began from the premise that oppression was most immediately a
psychological problem” (1978:271). But such an analysis is by no means
unusual. John Saul writes about the period after the so-called vacuum left
by the repression of the 1970s writers of Biko’s generation in ways that
suggest the lack generally attributed to Black Consciousness:
In the first instance [the vacuum of the 1960s was filled] by the
emergence of the Black Consciousness movement. An ideological
project that paralleled other cultural nationalist expressions of the time
(like ‘Black Power’ in North America), it was largely the creation of
petty bourgeois intellectuals (albeit many of them of impressive
stature, like Steve Biko) with separatist overtones, limited strategic
sense and a minimal grasp of the possible role of popular classes in
effecting social change. However, as a reaffirmation of racial pride and
of the sentiment of resistance to the apartheid dispensation, Black
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Consciousness was significant. Perhaps, as its themes began to permeate
the ambience within which new generations were growing up, its
immediate importance was more psychological than political. (1993:7)
Taken on the plane of ideology, Biko’s interventions are thereby rendered
little more than a continuation of a longstanding Africanist strand in the
argument of nationalism. What it amounts to is a critique of what Fanon
once called lactification, by which he meant the psychological aspiration to
accede to the condition of whiteness.8  At another level, it displaces, as Saul
would have it, the political by elevating the psychological, and in this regard
is to be found wanting.
In the narration of his tragic death at the hands of the apartheid state one
cannot but notice how such psychologism enables a rather heroic construction
of mind versus might, so that the physical torture of the body meets its match
in the strength of the mind. Unfortunately, this very conception was also
used by Drs. Lang and Tucker who were accused of complicity, because of
their failure to intervene upon examining the ailing Biko, in the cause of his
death. Under cross-examination at the inquest called to rule on the death of
Biko, Ivor Lang claimed that he had been summoned to the offices of the
security police on September 7, 1977 because Biko “would not speak”. In
his testimony, Lang attributed the staggering gait to shamming on the part
of Biko (although later he claimed that the thick speech was a consequence
of a lip injury and the ataxic gait was because Biko had been manacled and
his ankles swollen), and claimed that he found no abnormality or pathology
in the patient. Similarly, the security branch officers claimed that on 7
September, “Biko had gone berserk, assaulted people and had to be
restrained by force” (Yap and Steyn 1977:2). As a measure of the truth,
history rearranges these words uttered by those complicit with an act of
violence to insist that Biko did not die without putting up a fight.
To run these two narratives together, the story of the interiority of the self
versus the sovereignty of power and the story of mind versus might, is to
encounter the schism that operates in the philosophical field of will and
power, the same dilemma that renders Biko’s history inconclusive. But the
ANC’s resolution to the crisis, judging from its 1977 programme, is to
merely call attention to a transcendental outside without recognising how
such a move is little more than the return of the same.9 In other words, by
adopting the programme of internal colonialism, the ANC was also restating
the argument about the character of subjection under apartheid. What was
in question was the potential for Black Consciousness to “stage an
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insurrection” as Tambo put it, and not merely a rebellion against apartheid
domination. Working on the self was clearly, in the ANC’s view, no match
for sovereign power.
The potential of the concept of Black Consciousness, incidentally, was
more readily appreciated in the argument of Donald Woods, whose book
Biko replays the central narrative of reconciliation and implicates the
subject in the unfolding logic of its politics. In Woods’ narrative Biko, the
subject, is the point of the return of the same through the politics of
difference, the very condition that might make the enlightenment possible
to contemplate within the condition of apartheid.
One particular excerpt from Woods’ narrative may help to elaborate this
point more clearly. It is drawn from the section of the narrative that deals
with personal memories and opens the scene for a recollection of the way
in which Biko’s politics were intrinsically bound to his personality. Woods
writes:
Steve Biko was the greatest man I ever met. What determines greatness?
How does one measure it? Each of us has his [sic] own criteria? When
I say that Steve Biko was the greatest man I ever had the privilege to
know, I mean quite literally that he, more than any other person I have
encountered, had the most impressive array of qualities and abilities in
that sphere of life which determines the fates of most people – politics.
This doesn’t mean that he was merely a superb politician. He was much
more than that. He was a statesman, in that sense of the word in which
it is applied to Abraham Lincoln, having that breadth of vision and that
wider comprehension of the affairs of men and nations that is conveyed
to the listener through more than mere words. He could impart
understanding. He could enable one to share his vision and he could do
so with an economy of words because he seemed to communicate ideas
through extra-verbal media – almost physically. (1978:85)
This is a remarkable description for the purposes of our discussion, in
part because of the way it falters on the domain of the distribution of the
pronoun as it seeks out associations by which to enunciate a biography of
someone who operated, we are told, with an “economy of words”. We must
read in this excerpt a forewarning that an incomplete history awaits
completion. Proceeding with the anticipated tasks of completion, Woods
sets out to establish a presence over and above the division that often
bedevils the biography of Biko between interiority and exteriority. But such
a strategy that seeks the establishment of presence is haunted, I wish to
argue, by the constraints that determine the act of writing.
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Early in his narrative, Woods describes the difficult circumstances in
which his manuscript of Biko was prepared. Woods himself had been
banned and ordered not to write for five years. Writing therefore, he tells us,
had to proceed in secret and he had “been warned that the security police
would come at any time of day or night to ensure that [he] was not breaking
the ban on writing” (1978:15).
A little later, almost paradoxically, he directs us to the cultural chauvinism
that is harnessed by writing. If its tone is to be trusted, this is also where a
claim is made for that which will need to be forfeited if presence is to be
realised. Reflecting on his early years in the Transkei, Woods speaks of two
worlds, one black and one white, separated by writing:
A white child brought up in these circumstances, being taught to read
and write while noting that even adult tribesmen could not form a
single letter of the alphabet, understandably regarded blacks as inferior
and easily accepted the general white attitude that colour and race were
determinants of the chasm in cultures. (1978:54)
The relation between writing and reading and colour and race as well as
its consequence for something like culture is not altogether clear here. But
it does lead me to assume that in order to understand the desire to bridge the
chasm in what is called “cultures”, it may be necessary to return to the scene
of writing. I read Woods’ testimony, which is how he describes his text, as
an attempt to enter the scene of writing in order to establish presence. Whilst
presence is the authorising trope of this narration, we are also in the space
of what De Certeau marks as an impossible adequation between presence
and sign, a presence, in other words, taken away from the sign. At the
beginning of writing, De Certeau reminds us, there is a loss (1984:195). In
the narrative of Donald Woods, it is writing itself which is elided.
The story of Biko interlaced with the philosophy of Black Consciousness
is presented compositely as an idea that can be reconciled with the best
tenets of liberalism. But liberalism thus conceived is necessarily to be
rethought in the predicament of apartheid. The association with Abraham
Lincoln, we will recall, is not merely coincidental. In this respect, the
narrative of Biko is to be read as an argument against a specific liberal
response to apartheid even as it argues for a different conception thereof.
Writing, for example, about black responses to what he calls the liberalism
of the white Progressive Federal Party (PFP), Woods notes:
The PFP has some excellent individuals, and blacks obviously prefer
them to the Nationalists, but blacks are increasingly becoming cynical
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about the PFP’s rejection of sanctions as a weapon against apartheid.
They see the PFP as a party-political apostle of capitalism which puts
capital interest rates above black interests. In this way, the gray areas
in South African political life are being washed away and the scene is
increasingly being deep-etched in black and white. (1978:395)
By brief recourse to the metaphor of writing, “a scene deep-etched in
black and white”, the text leads us through a critique of liberalism, but one
directed at the logic of a nineteenth-century missionary discourse. In the
space of the argument in which Biko’s objections to liberalism are lodged,
Woods seeks to rewrite the terms of liberalism adequate to the tasks of a
critique of apartheid. Its characteristic is one of disagreement, persuasion
and, most of all, recognition of the diversity necessary in the politics that
seeks to achieve a particular postcolonial public sphere. This line of
argument is in keeping with the central thesis of Kant’s which, as Alisdair
MacIntyre points out, holds that thinking for oneself always does require
thinking in co-operation with others, even as some episodes of thought
consist of solitary monologues (1999).
Woods sets out to draw out the enlightenment theme in Biko’s elaboration
of the concept of Black Consciousness, even as he suggests that subjectivation
is an inadequate response to apartheid’s difference. By rearticulating the
basic tenets of liberalism as expressed in the ideals of the enlightenment,
and shifting the focus from its missionary or paternalistic obligations,
Woods rewrites the story of Biko as fundamentally reconcilable to the rules
of a properly constituted public sphere set against the repressive apparatus
of the apartheid state.
Both the concepts of internal colonialism and enlightened liberalism are
situated in a particular relationship to Black Consciousness represented by
the thought of Steve Biko. That relationship is especially pronounced in the
attempt to complete the story of Steve Biko by filling in the gap of the
missing exterior. Confounded by the supposed absence of an end point, the
production of concepts of internal colonialism and enlightened liberalism
are ways of calling attention to a lack in the formulation of the argument of
Black Consciousness. Historians recognise this as the necessary condition
of biography – a subject in context.10
Rather than reconciling presence to sign, postcolonial histories should
work towards establishing the productivity of incomplete histories as a
strategy for engaging the apparatus of reading. The history of Biko cannot
possibly come to rest with the politics of identity but must begin to reassess
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the realm of biography. Such a reassessment is enabled by considering the
point at which the reading of Biko’s I Write What I Like falters and makes
possible another reading.
Writing  History
Hilda Bernstein reminds us that between 18 August and 6 September,
shortly after his arrest at a police roadblock, Biko was held incommunicado
at the Walmer Police Station, “without books, papers, materials of any
kind” (Bernstein 1978:35).11 He was accused variously of not having
written permission for leaving the area to which his banning order restricted
him, and for having drawn up inflammatory pamphlets which he intended
distributing. At the trial of seven accused members of the South African
Students Organisation (SASO) in May 1976, the prosecution subjected
Biko to lengthy cross-examination about his writing and its implications.
Yet, the various encounters with Biko have been little more than attempts
at manipulating an exteriority by bringing it into some relation of
reconciliation to the interiority of his thought – what in other words is the
staple of Cartesian philosophy. Biko, we might conclude from this corpus,
cannot conceivably write what he likes. Black Consciousness has in turn
been represented as an interplay of the process of epidermalisation and
consciousness and, as such, the story of Biko is the history of the unity of
presence and sign. One consequence of this narrativisation of Biko is that
it achieves the re-centering of the subject even as it explicitly elides the
potentiality of writing.
On May 6, 1976, at the trial of the SASO 7, as it has become known, Steve
Biko was questioned about an article he had written under the pseudonym
Frank Talk and titled “Fear – an Important Determinant in South African
Politics”. Attwell, the state prosecutor, read out aloud several paragraphs
of the text to Biko who was then cross-examined about their meaning and
social implications – a kind of semio-historical interpretive exercise. More
precisely, Attwell’s reading seeks to draw out the strategy in Biko’s writing
by which the terms ‘liberal’ and ‘white’ are produced as substitutable so as
to implicate the author in an act of political treason. Quoting from I Write
What I Like, Attwell directed the court’s attention firstly to the paragraph,
written by Biko we are told, in which he claims:
To look for instances of cruelty at those who fall into disfavour with the
security police is perhaps to look too far. One need not try to establish
the truth of a claim that Black people in South Africa have to struggle
for survival. It presents itself in ever so many facets of our lives.
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Township life alone makes it a miracle for anyone to live up to
adulthood. There we see a situation of absolute want in which Black
will kill Black to be able to survive. That is the basis of vandalism,
murders, rapes and plunder that goes on while the real source of evil,
White society, are suntanning on exclusive beaches or relaxing in
bourgeois homes. (Millard 1979:288)
Reading in the paradigmatic frameworks of a state, Attwell proceeded to
articulate a ‘deeper’ meaning to the interpretation of Black Consciousness
than simply one that emphasised the contours of a cultural argument about
being Black. Affirming that these quotations indeed reflected Biko’s
sentiments, Attwell hastily followed with a second quotation which he, once
again, read out aloud to Biko and the court:
Clearly, Black people cannot respect White people, at least not in this
country. There is such an obvious aura of immorality and naked cruelty
in all that is done in the name of White people that no Black man, no
matter how intimidated, can ever be made to respect White society.
However, in spite of the obvious contempt for the values cherished by
the Whites and the price at which White comfort and security is
purchased, Blacks seem to me to have been successfully cowed down
by the type of brutality that emanates from this section of the community.
(Millard 1979:288)
Finally, Attwell cited a lengthy quotation which demanded, it would
seem, a practice of reading that would penetrate the depths of Black
Consciousness thinking and jettison the cultural veneer in which it was
expressed. Referring to the second paragraph on the right hand column of
page eleven, Attwell again quoted the article allegedly written by Biko:
This is a dangerous type of fear, for it only goes skin deep. It hides
underneath it an immeasurable rage that often threatens to erupt.
Beneath it lies naked hatred for a group that deserves absolutely no
respect. Unlike in the rest of the French or Spanish former colonies,
where chances of assimilation made it not impossible for Blacks to
aspire towards being White, in South Africa whiteness has always been
associated with police brutality and intimidation, early morning pass
raids, general harassment in and out of the townships, and hence no
Black really aspires to be White. The claim by Whites of monopoly on
comfort and security has always been so exclusive that Blacks see
Whites as the major obstacles in their progress towards peace, prosperity
and a sane society. Through its associations with all these negative
aspects whiteness has thus become soiled beyond recognition. At best
therefore Blacks see whiteness as a concept that warrants being
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despised, hated, destroyed and replaced by an aspiration with more
human content in it. At worst, Blacks envy White society for the
comfort it has usurped, and at the centre of this envy is the wish, nay,
the secret determination in the innermost minds of most Blacks who
think like this to kick Whites off those comfortable garden chairs that
one sees as he rides in a bus out of town, and to claim them for himself.
Day by day one gets more convinced that Aimé Cesaire could not have
been right when he said: “No race possesses the monopoly on truth,
intelligence, force, and there is room for all of us at the rendezvous of
victory.” (Millard 1979:289)
Unlike the tasks of reading generally undertaken in a literary register, the
law, like history, approaches the enunciative statement in terms of exegesis.
In some respects, the use of the metaphor of a fear that is skin deep and a
thinking that is profoundly deeper encourages an exegetical programme of
reading. But more interesting are the ways in which “reading like a state”
elides the difficulty of self-writing that permeates the text. The state, we
might say, sought to establish a monopoly over the project of reading and
as such obscured the politics of writing.
The pursuit for monopoly over reading is foregrounded in the concerted
effort to find a filiative connection between author and text at the trial of the
SASO 7. Here again the logic deployed by the state prosecutor is to
reconcile Biko to writing and by extension to treason. But as is clear from
the court proceedings turned reading lesson, it proved far more inconvenient
to simply connect writing to author. At one stage during the proceedings
Attwell inquired how widespread was the knowledge that Frank Talk was
the pseudonym used by Biko. Biko admitted that Barney Pityana and Strini
Moodley knew and that others may have guessed from the style of writing.
He insisted further that anybody who wrote regularly developed a style
(Millard 1979:295). He also noted that the use of a pseudonym was directed
at focusing attention on the content rather than, as he put it, the man.
The surrender of the responsibility attached to authorial agency is crucial
here and should not, I would suggest, simply be approached as a position
adopted in relation to a repressive state apparatus represented by the court
of law. Rather, we have here a specific clearing of space in which Biko
might chide the shortcomings of the reader who seeks to hold him responsible
for what he has written. How else might we understand Biko’s constant
demands that the entire article be read or his pointing out that the meaning
of a particular excerpt of his writing was self-explanatory? How might we
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explain his question to Attwell, rather annoyed at his cross-examiner’s
inadequacy, “Can’t you read?”
Attwell, we might say, was clearly not up to the task of reading. The
reading lesson ended in chaos since the writer could not, it appears, be made
to take responsibility for the reading of the state. In some respects the writer
could not be held complicitous with the reading since he had relinquished
responsibility, vacated the scene of writing, so to speak. Or we might say
that the writer and writing have become indistinguishable, and that a
reading aimed at discerning the subject is rendered impossible. Writing as
such involves transcending the predicament of internal colonialism, the
enabling possibility of writing one’s way out of a predicament of complicity,
into a yet to be determined space. For the ANC and Donald Woods that
space is designated respectively by a transcendental signifier. The task, in
each case, is instructed to the desiring subject and a writing that is anterior
to the subject.
Self-Writing and Postcolonial Difference
Whether in the logic of internal colonialism or enlightened liberalism,
Steve Biko and his writing are frequently seen as giving rise to the thought
of reconciliation. As such his writing assumes something of a prophetic
structure as it programmatically seeks to reconstitute the subject of a new
humanism. In the process of scripting death and prescribing life, the
apparatus of reading identifies a subject that is fully formed, reconciled, as
I have argued. The mode of reading is biographical.
How then might I Write What I Like serve as the very condition for a
different concept of difference – a concept of postcolonial difference after
the experience of apartheid that refuses to transform Biko into a prophet of
reconciliation? Perhaps, I will suggest, by taking seriously Biko’s question
and injunction: Can’t you read? This is, in every conceivable sense, a rather
unsettling instance that addresses not so much the correctness of
interpretation but rather the very disciplinary techniques by which reading
is authorised – that is the apparatus of reading. It is, we might say, the point
at which a strategy of reading Biko’s writing is rendered unsustainable.
I Write What I Like has been read as ethical and political statement that
aspires to a reconciliation of presence and sign. But I will argue that it more
readily contributes to elaborating a concept of postcolonial difference at the
point at which it eludes this fabricated history. This is the point of the text’s
unintelligibility to an apparatus of reading that seeks to appropriate it to the
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genre of biography. In particular, I want to argue that these elusive
principles can be tracked through the disintegration of subjectivity that the
text entertains. At issue here is not the disappearance of subjectivity, but
rather the argument that agitation towards reconstituting subjectivity cannot
logically proceed without a certain measure of disintegration and insecurity.
In the trial turned reading lesson Biko points out “that at best, Blacks see
whiteness as a concept that warrants being despised, hated, destroyed and
replaced by an aspiration with more human content in it” (my emphasis)
Yet in the essay titled “We Blacks” that Mark Sanders cites as an example
of the embodiment of complicity and its negotiation in Black Consciousness,
we encounter the following formulation:
The type of black man we have today has lost his manhood. Reduced
to an obliging shell, he looks with awe at the white power structure and
accepts what he regards as the ‘inevitable position’…All in all the
black man has become a shell, a shadow of a man, completely defeated,
drowning in his own misery, a slave, an ox bearing the yoke of
oppression with sheepish timidity. (2002:176)12
There is a sense in which the problem of subjection is resolved through
nostalgia of the specifically masculine subject, a process of seeking to
restore its agency within the argument of Black Consciousness.13  The desire
to constitute the subject, to think beyond the confines of subjection that is
materialised, however, encounters the historical limit posed by the concept
of whiteness. In the fabricated history of reading, Biko is presented as being
invested in the project of biography, precisely because he is read into the
history of reconciliation between subjection and subjectivation. This is
after all the condition prescribed for the post-apartheid national subject, a
subject that is also expected to live in a utopian empty homogeneous time
that is not its own, in an imagined nation that has as yet not come into its
own.
In the fold of the impossible adequation between presence and sign, a
history of the imprisoning concept demands to be read. At the trial of the
SASO 7 for example, Biko pointed out why the thought of the disintegration
of the subject was so crucial in his elaboration of the concept of Black
Consciousness:
Well, it helps to build up the sense of insecurity which is part of the
feeling of incompleteness. You are not a complete human being. You
cannot walkout when you like, you know, that sort of feeling. It is an
imprisoning concept itself. (Millard 1979:30).
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Set against the active voice of biography, this statement enables a
postcolonial aesthetic, politics and epistemology. In particular, it marks the
weight of the constraint of an apparatus of reading even as it overflows with
subjectivity. This, I will argue, is precisely because as it undoes the rules of
biography prescribed by the apparatus of reading, it simultaneously draws
attention to what must remain unintelligible to the apparatus of reading. The
statement is symptomatic of potential not in spite of constraint but in direct
relation to constraint. As such it is the point at which a postcolonial
possibility is instituted in the writing of Steve Biko.
Conclusion
I Write What I Like is less a text that supplements biography than one that
offers up strategies for thinking about the constraint posited by an apparatus
of reading. Rather than representing a passing phase in the struggle against
apartheid in South Africa, the text seeps into the postcolonial present by
making explicit the extent to which the critique of apartheid is, as yet, not
finished. In the process, it brings the techniques of confronting apartheid to
bear on the postcolonial problematic of self-writing.
The shift from biography to self-writing that I have narrativised in this
article leads us to think about the problem of the imprisoning concept that
defines the place of inaugurating postcolonial difference as we reread
Biko’s writing in the wake of apartheid.14 In this respect, the ‘disintegration’
of the subject is precisely the point at which an apparatus of reading is called
into question, if not undermined. It is after all the imprisoning concept that
presents us with the opportunity of “thinking, feeling and writing in a certain
way”, but preferably not in that order.15 Self-writing may thereby answer the
demand for finishing the critique of apartheid because as it makes available
the unintelligible in certain frameworks, it surprisingly overflows with
subjectivity.
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Notes
1. That resistance was adequately displayed at the recent Truth and Reconciliation
Commission hearings into the death of Biko at which the family rejected the
amnesty provisions of the commission.
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2. See Mangena’s suggestion that the effort to arrive at a clearer picture of Biko’s
death remained incomplete (1989:143).
3. The formulation may be found in Foucault (1972:238). Thanks to John Mowitt
for alerting me to the article.
4. For examples of similar encounters see Chatterjee (1998:284); Foucault
(1984:32-50); Deleuze (1988:94); and Spivak (1988:291).
5. See also Pholandt-McCormick (1999: Chapter Four).
6. I too have, elsewhere, been guilty of such a hasty conclusion. See the final
chapter of my doctoral dissertation (Lalu 2003). Kopano Ratele pressured me
to think through the equivalence that I have drawn and this article is, in part,
an effort at addressing his question and concern.
7. In claiming that notions of self-help derived from earlier Africanist strands in
political mobilisation, scholars such as Gerhart clearly track the emergence of
the tendency to the founding of the ANC under the leadership of John
Langalibalele Dube. See for example Marks (1986:54).
8. See Mowitt (2002:38).
9. Since Biko reads Fanon, and Fanon reads Nietzsche, Biko might be articulating
a problem at the very root of a philosophical tradition that calls into question
the basis of Cartesian philosophy.
10. An exception is Ciraj Rassool’s PhD dissertation which sets to work on the
cultural production of biography.
11. At the trial of the SASO 7, Biko noted that his restrictions prohibited him from
compiling, editing or disseminating any publication in which government
policy is either defended or attacked (Millard 1979:278).
12. It is important to remember that Sanders’ attempt to track the itinerary of the
intellectual through the concept of complicity must simultaneously obscure all
those moments of irresponsibility that activate the demand for a replacement of
the other – and sometimes violently so. It is precisely in renouncing the history
of responsibility, which is also to say the narration of irresponsibility, that the
concept of the foldedness of human being that Sanders develops is perhaps at
the limit, precisely because it sets out to affirm, rather than critique, the
apparatus of reading. For it is in this slippage that we might call into question
the purported transcendence indicated in the thematic of intersubjectivity.
Beatrice Hanssen, in a not unrelated example, has argued that Fanon’s later
troubling embrace of violence as a way of taking-the-other’s-place is a far cry
from the plea for transcendence in intersubjective love that framed the earlier
work (2000:153).
13. See Ratele (2003).
14. Here I am especially grateful to Qadri Ismail for his reading of Fanon’s
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Wretched of the Earth  in a public talk entitled “Let us Leave the West,” given
at the University of Minnesota in March 2003.
15. See for example Williams on commitment in writing in What I Came to Say
(1989:259).
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